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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
This papex is subl':1itted in an effort to bring into perspective the
gxants cl ern ent s of social secu1'ity which have contxibuted to vast eco-
rrorri ic changes and to which, paxacloxically, they rnust also adapt.
In Grants Ec onornic s: A SiInple Intxoduction, the aut h 0 r s ,
Kenneth E. Boulcling, Martin Pfaff, and Janos Hor va th, contend that the
theory of llExchange Econornics11, which has dorninated the study of how
a society is organized since Adar:n.Smith, is no longer sufficient for the
IS of conternpoxary econoInies. Social security is a case In point.
It is a governrnent prograIn Inaturing in a muc h different econoInic and
social ClilYlate than the one in which it was initiated. It has undertaken
to provide values fox a group within the society for which the group does
not r epa.y the total cost. It is, thexefore, a subsidized prograrn, and
subsidies, together with several other form.erly arnbiguous transactions
are fc und to be arnenable to analytical treatrnent within the scope of
grants econonlics.
Scope
As its title iInplies, this study will confine analysis to the grant
el ern ent in the old ag~ (retirernent) benefit (OAI) of the social security
program (OASDHI). It is, of course, im.possible to t r eat one aspect
without reference to the vlhole. After all, old age security is but one of
1
the rooms l"nth e social welfare statehouse. Ot.h e: d h, " 1's are eat, disability,
unemployment, medical care, and FarniIy subsidy. This paper will con-
centrate on the retirement benefit as the one which is clearly representa-
tive of an intergenerational grant- -with cons equerit significant distri buti ve
effects on the economy. Its scope, however, will not be confined to
measuring the intergenerational grant, but will includ e horizontal intra-
generational grant rneasurernents which further illustrate the economic
complexities and the paradoxical na.ture of the social security retirement
program, as well as the fallacy of considering it as insurance.
Though the tax/benefit ratio between the present worker and those
now retired is the subject of much conternporary criticism, it is based
on projecting the future; but, speculation as to future benefits and futu r e
taxes is not the subject of this paper. It deals only with what is presently
known--with benefits now being paid to retirees who have already con-
t r ibut ed thei r taxe s ,
One other point needs clarification before proceeding: Whethe l'
the term used is OAI (old age insurance) or OASI (old age and survivor-
ship insurance), the benefit referred to is the retirelTIent benefit only
(OAI), whereas the tax referred to is the tax for l"etireIDent and sur-
vivorship (OASl).
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SECTION II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
Coals
As early as 1912, the Progressive Party had urged old-age pensions,
and by 1934 rn o r e than thi rty states had such prog r a.rn s . F''r a nk l tn Delano
Roosevelt, as Governor of New York, had sponsored the first state e1'ner-
gency relief program. In the Presidential election of 1932, the qu e s tiori
of federal relief became a ca rn pa.i g n issue. The Depression had high-
lighted the prob1ern of econornic s ec ur ity and when Roosevelt b e ca rn e
President on March 4, 1933, he viewed his victory as a clear rri a rrda t e to
use the powers of the Federal Governrnent to rernedy the situation.
By the middle of 1934, rnany national1eaclers, both in and out of
government, had becorne convinced. of the necessity for a cornprchensive
Federal prograrn of social insurance or public assistance, or both. A
nunl.ber of factors accounted for thi s conviction- -a conviction which cx-
pressed a profound change in thinki rig I r orri previous periods wh en
Arnerican leadership opposed Federal prograrns in the econornic security
f i eld. But chief arrlOng them was the Great De p r e s s ion . Between 192.9
and 1933, the gross national product fell horn $lCH billion to $56 billion.
As a result, unernployrnent soared and by 1933 one person out of every
foul' in the entire United States labor force was without a job. Eighty-
five thousand businesses failed, and nine rnillion savings accQl.tnb we r c
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lost as banks closed their doors. By every rn ea s u r em ent , it was a rnaJor
calarnity and it produced violent reaction. "This nation asks for action,
and action now .... We must act and act quickly." are words from the In-
augural address of the incorrling President Franldin Delano Roosevelt,
and, writes Arthur Schlesinger, "Congress and the country were sub-
jected to a presidential "barrage: of ideas and programs unlike anything
.5
known to Arn e r ica.n history." This was the fa rn o us Hunch-ed Days of the
New Deal. In all, some fifteen rrra.j o r bills were passed: arnong them", the
Federal Enlergency Relief Act (FERi\'), which initiated a new phase of na-
tional policy- -the relief of destitution.
The numerous New Deal p r og r a.m s introduced in the early years of
the Roosevelt adrninistration rn a.de a t r erri erid ou s impact on the Arri er ica n
people and resulted in a feeling that the beneficial aspects of these pro-
grams should be preserved. The groundwork for a p c r rna nc nt prograrn
had been established the FERA and related projects, which necessitated
well-organized state welfare agencies to a drrri ni s t e r Federal g rant«. As a
result, every local area had s orn e public weHare office, and the nation
was therefore better oqu ipp ed than it had cv cr been before to ha nd lc a
nationally established prograrn. All eluring this period, the rn overn cnt fo r
social insurance was growing. Workrnen's cornpensation had been c s tab-
lished in practically all states. The Democratic party pl a tfo rm of 1932
advocated "unemployment and old-age: insurance. "
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In June 1934, President Roosevelt appointed the Corrirn itt e e on Eco-
rio rrri c Security to Lrnp l erri e nt his campaign p r orrii s e s , On January 17, 1935,
President Roosevelt t r a n s rn itt e d the Report of the Corn m itt e e to Congress,
and in his special rnessage urged q uick action to enact its principal recorn-
rn enda.ti o.ns into law. The sarne day, a bill entitled The Ec oriorrri c Se c ur ity
Act wa s introduced into both rio u s e s of Congress. The Social Security Act,
as it carne to be called and a s finally passed, did not encompass all of the
recOlTImendations of the CorrllTIittee on Economic Security, but it adopted
the basic recornrnendations of the Corn m itt e e , It established a fe d e rally
administered c orn pu l s o r y old-age insLHance prograrn (actually called Old-
Age Benefits), gLclnts to states for old-age assistance, a state operated
system of unernployment insurance, grants to states for needy dependent
children, grants to states for rnat e r na.l and child welfare, grants to states
for aid to the blind, and rna d e other provisions. It was, in fact, an OITUll-
bus act.
I-Iowevel", probably the rnost im po r tarit of the prograrns was the one
comn'1ordy refel"red to as "ol d age insurance!'. More people were affected
by it, and more rnone)" was involved in it than in any of the others; Ju r thc r-
rnore, it was the only one in the Social SeclHity Act which was cOH1pletely
,+
fede rall y admini ste red.
The accepted objective or goal of old age insurance was to p r ovid c
a basic floor of protection against economic adversity, and this was the
principle on which its constitutionality was confirmed by the 51_1pl'CrnC CrJllrt.
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Evolutionary DevelopIYlent of OA51
The 1935 Social 5ecurity Act established a relatively s im p.le s v s t e rn
of old age benefits and cash refunds for death: After age 65, the benefits
were payable upon retireIYlent. They were weighted to give higher
arnounts to those with short s e r vi c e or with low wages, but nevertheless
6
with considerable ernphasis on paying larger benefits to those with long
periods of contributions. The s v s t crn was to be financed cOIYlpletely by
equal ernployer and erri pl oy e e contributions. The covered group con-
sisted essentially of all workers in industry and cOlnrnerce.Wages
above $3,000 a year were not taxed or credited, and the r a t e of 1% pre-
~" ."
vailed.
Since 1937, the benefits have increased, the tax rate has increased,
the taxable wage has increased, coverage has b e c orri e practically univer-
sal, and the retirelYlent test has been libel"alized a.rid o-na.de rn o r e flexible.
FroIYl 1937 through 1956, the old age and survivorship benehts were
the only benefits available and these w e r e a va iLa.bl c only to a relatively
linlited group of wage ca r ric r s .
In 1957, disability insurance was added and in 1966 huspital insur-
ance was added to the original benefits. Tax rates a l s o went up. Ex-
eluding the percent of contributory tax for disability and for hospital,
the rate for old age and survivorship benefits, whi c h had been 1% each
for ernployer and eIYlployee f rc.rn 1937 th r cu gh 1949, was increased l'!
1 1/2% in 1950 to 2% in 1954 and in twelve subsequent intervals, at al-
most yearly anniversaries, reached a rate of 4.3% in 1973. When the ad-
ditional tax for disability (.55) and the tax for hospital insurance (1.00) is
added, it produces the present rate of 5.85%.
The social security taxable wage base, which was $3000 through 1950,
increased to $3600 in 1951, to $4200 in 1955, to $4800 in 1959, to $6600
in 1966, to $7800 in 1968, to $9000 in 1972, to $10,800 in 1973 and to
$13,200 in 1974.
These increases in the tax rate and wage base of social security
were required in order to pay the increased retirement benefits 1egis-
Ia te d by Congress between 1950 and 1972. During that period, there
were eight benefit increas es for a cumu1ati ve 142%. In 1972, Cong res s
also provided for future autornatic cost-of-lving benefit increases equiva-
lent to the increases in the consurn er price index. Increases can occur
only once a year, provided that the consumer price index has increased
by at least 30/0and that legislation increasing benefits has neither been
enacted nor become effective in the pr evi cu s year. Also, when benefits
are increased under the cost-of-living adjustrnent provisions, the wage
base and the exen1.pt arn ount of earnings under the retirement test will
be increased automatically according to the rise in average wages
_ _ G
covered under the social security pr ogr arn ,
The development of the social security program has evidencec1more
of the characteristics of mutation than simpl e evolution. What started
as a Trusteed Plan for providing old age r-eri r ern ent benefits to wage
7
earners In industry and cornrnerce has becorn e a Pay-as- You-Go univer-
sal welfare prograITl, providing hospital (rnedicare) benefits, disability
benefits and survivorship benefits, as well as retirernent benefits, and the
total annual cost is rn et by the annual a s se s srn erit against the working
population.
In describing the evolution of the financing rnethod, Appendix I of
Actuarial Study No. 49 says:
Just as the benefit forrnula i's a blend of equity and adequacy,
with mu ch greater empha si s on the latter, so is the financing
rnethod a blend of llresel've" and "pay-as-you-go", with the
latter having the greater weight. Both of these blends, with
the weight shifted to "adequacy" and Ilpay-as_you_goll respec-
tively, were inherent in the 1939 Arn endrn ent s and have m et
the very severe tests to which they have been subjected In
the unprecedented conditions of the last 20 years."7
COITlITlentingon this description, Ray M. Peterson, Fellow of the
Society of Actuaries, posed thi s question:
Is there danger that we are over opt.irn i s t ic as to the succe s s
of the financing rri ethod to date? It has been operating during
a period when the systern was imrn a tu r e and the cori t r ibutions
rnodest- -when the actuarial or rrioney value of the benefit to
a recipient has been rnany tirnes the arn ou.nt of contribution
made with respect to the recipient."
Mr. Peterson also sound ed a further coritempo r arv aIa irri when
he observed:
Equations cannot rn ea sur e the co.ntr ibu tor l s willingness and
capacity to pay; they ca.nriot rn ea sur e the sounclnc s s of the
principles of equity between individuals and generations, nor
the r eadine s s of indi viduals to a cc ept such principle s; they
do not reveal the broad social and econornic effect of crJrnplll-
sory pr og r arn s , and they cannot control the extent of the ob Ii >
" t i 1 1 Igahons one genera i ori paces Llponanother .
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SECTION III
GRANT ASPECTS OF OLD AGE BENEFITS (OASI)
UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
In order to under stand the full econornic impact of the pension
portion of the social security program (Oi'\SI) it is necessary to identify
its structure in economic terms.
Although OASI is widely thought of as rn s ur ance and aIth ough it
may qualify as insurance in a limited way, it is one of the purposes of
this paper to determine whether it is indeed insurance or a grant, or a
cornbination of the two; and, In the proce s s, to give reasons Lor label-
ing its constituent parts.
Prelirninary to making a distinction between what is insurance
and what is a grant, it is appropriate to give brief text book de.fini t.i ons
of the elernents being measured:
"Grant", per se, is a main classification word, and in eco-
nornic terms r ef e r s to a one-way transfer of sornething ex-
cm.ngeable; i. e., A gives sornething exchangeable to B; B
gi ves nothing exchangeable to A.
Insurance is a sub- classification word unde r the econolTlic
terrn "Exchange"; i. e., A gives sornc:Lhing to Band B
gives sornething to A; in other words, a two-way transfer.
A grant can be defined, but it presents c ornpl ex it.i es in iclentiLi-
cation. This is clue to the fact that it rna y be irnrn cd ia t e 01' deferred
and that the Tecipient may seek it, or the clonor rnay Hlitiate it. In
addition, the results rnay not be clearly rnea s urabl e , a.ncl the parLicip3nLs
9
rnay be unlin'lited in numb er and r emoved in tirri e ,
An exchange, on the other hand, is relatively sirnple to identify
as well as to define. This is due to the fact that there is a rn ea sur abl e
result accruing to each side of a two- sided transaction.
Insurance, in its generic sense, rneans simply an indernnity con-
tract between two parties, each of the parties exchanging one value for
another. In its industry sense, insurance r ern a.in s an exchange trans-
action, but it is not only a contract for indernnity or benefit, but for a
guaranteed arnoLlnt, detennined actua r ia l.ly and funded on the basis of the
type of contract and the risks involved.
It is the support of old age through the explicit ea r-rna r.king of the
social security tax for the provision of a retirernent benefit which has
tended to confuse a social welfare benefit with insurance. However,
the financing D'lethod developed to pay for social security benefits is
fundaD'lentally different f r orn that us ed fo r pri vate, inchvidual in sur anc e
and pension plans. If, indeed, social security benefits were policy
benefits, there would be rigid a dher ence to the principle of deterrnining
the arn ourit of ernployce1s benefit by the arnoun t of contribution paid by
1
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the ernployee and by the em.ployer forhirn; it would require varying
rates of contriblltions for different classes of ernployees, being subject
to the calendar year of entrance into the systern, his age at that tirne,
as well as his status in society. In the social secu r it y systern, the
rnoney rieeded copay benefits to old-age and sur vi vor beneficiaries cornes
from the current contributions by employees, employers, and the se1£-
employed.
JohnA Brittain, a senior fellow in the Brookings Economics
Studies prograrn, sees the essence of the retire,Tnent cornponent of the
social security system as a current transfer program under which the
working generation pays taxes to finance benefits to those who have re-
tired.ie' This concept implies pure grant and illustrates our earlier defi-
nition of a grant- -A gives someth~ng exchangeable to B; B gives nothing
exchangeable to A. In this case, A represents the working generation;
11
B represents the retired generation.
This view is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court, start-
ing with its first decision bearing on the constitutionality of the original
Social Security Act, has held that there is no necessary relationship be-
tween taxes paid and benefits received, and that OASI benefits should be
viewed as corning under the general statutes regarding gifts. For ex-
ample, in 1936 in Helvering v. Davis {30l U. S. 619, 6<10)it clearly in-
dicated that the Social Security Act was constitutional because the sys-
tern of old-age benefits was a fo rrn of public charity. Also, in the govern-
mentIs brief' for Arthur S. F'Lernrning , then Secretary of HEVr, in Flern-
rning v. Nestor, the pr onouric ern crit (1959) was again that social security
was a welfare instrUlTlent. The COU1"tagreed.
.Toh,n A. B'rit ta in+s concept of social security as a current transfer
pl"ogram is contained in his book, The Puyroll Tax for Social Security,
and is the essence of his reasoning for doing away with the payroll tax
In favor of general revenue financing, obtained by raising Income tax
rates on a progressive basis. He sees the insurance element of social
security as a myth that should be discarded in favor of wh a.t he sees to
be the reality.
A contrary vi ew is taken by Robert J. Myers, who was Chief
Ac tua r y of the Social Security Administration from 1947 to 1970 and
who is currently Professor of Actuarial Science at Ternple University.
He says that the insurance concept is no rnyth and is, in fact, one of
the real underlying strengths of the prograrn_. He contends that Dr.
Brittain has seriously m_isinterpreted a sta t ern ent about the insurance
principle in social security made by the Executive Branch to the Su-
preme Court--"The OASI is in no sense a federally-adrninistered 'in-
surance program f under which each worker pays 'prerniurns' over the
years and acquires at r-et i r ern ent an indefeasible right", Wha.t is nut
realized, says Myers, is the signiLicance that no cornrna is present
after "insurance program". What the sentence means wi thout the
cornma is that OASI i s not the kind of an in S ura.n c e pT"_)gr a rn of the pe
described In the "under which" clause, although it may well be SrJD"1e
other type of federally aclrninistered insurance prograrn. Mr. Myers
argues that since the benefit structure of OASI is related to earnings,
the cost of the prograrn can be a c t ua r ia ILy evaluated in a r ca s oria bl y
reliable manner, to the same extent as group insurance plans of a p r i ;
12
vate nature. Just because the payroll tax for social security benefits is
assignable to employees in the aggregate (rather than individually on a
strict pro rata basis) does not destroy the insurance principle inherent,
anymore than it does for group plans, under which ernployees do not
usually share equally (or proportionately with salary) in the employer's
contributions. We quote NIl'. Myers directly:
Social Security benefits can properly be considered as just
another type of service and commodity that individuals are
purchasing. The fact that the law compels thern to rnak e
this purchase seerns no rnor e rrnpo r ta.nt than that they are
compelled by a law of nature to consurne fooel (vvhich they
rriust purchase). It seerns democratic that the prices of
goods and services should be the same for everybody, so
that people are not subject to the stigrna of being second-
class citizens to whorn goverrnnent-required lower prices
are applicable. II
This concept implies pure exchange; i. e., A, the worker, pur-
chases a pension by rn ea.ns of his and his ernpl oye r l s contributions to
a combined trust fund, B, the rri cdiurn for paying retirement benefits
to the participating group.
There is probably no other legislative eria ctrn ent that cornrnits
future generations to gr ea t er obligations than our Social Security Act.
It involves complex integrative grant relationships over long periods
of tirn e ; and, as a rri a.t ter of good faith, there is no question but that the
benefits prornised are intended to be permanent and a s sur ed , Sorn e
years after the enactrnent of the or igina l Social Security Act, Franklin
D. Roosevelt supported it and the contributory principle in these words:
13
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We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the
contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect
their pensions and thei r unernployrnent benefits. With
those taxes in there, no darnn politician can ever scrap
. l' I~my SOCla secur ity program.
The following quotation from Jererny Bentham, a leading intellec-
tua l of the early nineteenth century, seems an appropriate conclusion to
this brief review of the intergenerational character of the grants con-
tained in OASI.
Speaking of the sages of a prior generation, Jererny Bentharn
wrote:
It is their prodigious anxiety for the welfare of their posterity
that produces the pr open sit y of these sages to tie up the hands
of this sarne posterity foreverrnore--to act as gua.rdians to its
perpetual and incurable weakness, and take its conduct forever
out of its OWTlhands.
If it be right that the conduct of the nineteenth century should
be determined not by its OWYl judgment but by that of the 18th,
it w-ill be equally right that the conduct of the 20th century
should be deterrnined not by its own judgrnent but by that of
the 19th. And if the sarne principle were still pursued, what
at length would be the consequence? The a.ggregate body of
the living would r ern a.i n fo r eve r in subjection to an inexorable
tyranny, exercised as it were by the aggregate body of the
Dead.
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SECTION IY
MEASURING THE GRANT ELEMENTS OF OAI
Introduction and General As sumptions
For purposes of measuring the gran: element in OAl, our computa-
tions are based on the following basic assumptions: Workers and their
spouses survive until retirement; thei r wages remain relatively con-
stant; the ernployer-employee tax pa yrn err.s accumulate to r et i r ernent
date at 3%; benefits rernain level af't'er retirernent and are discounted to
date of retireInent on the basi s of a 3% intere st factor and U. S. Popula-
han Tables of Mortality.
These assumptions are broad and cha.nges in anyone of thern would
alter the results; but, except for the interest assurnption, any r ea son-
able changes would only add emphasis to the conclusion that there are
substantial grants in OAI; a higher rate would narrow the size of the
arant- -all other factors remaining relatively equal- -while, conversely,
c>
a lower rate would increase it. Adrnittedly, interest assumptions in
"-" . I_) -r-
tax benefit calculations rernain tn elispute arnong expe r t s ; 3% howeve r ,
appears the rate of return on investrnent rnos t consistent over the long
te rm with that available to the average individual.
The effect of the survivorsbip benefit in OASl is not included in tbe
OAl rneasurernents wbich follow. Had a rri or tal itv factor been applied to
the contributions of the individual, it would have re duced the total tax
Excluding effect of inflation.
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accumulation and increased the size of the grant. However, had allow-
ance been made for the accLUYlulation of taxes collected from those who
died (disregarding all other benefits to their survivors), then the tax ac-
curnulation would have been greater and the grant size reduced.
It has been estilnated that benefits to survivors of deceased workers
I<f
represent approximately 23 % of the tax for OASI. In these corrrputa tioris ,
1000/0 (rather than 770/0) of the tax has been used as the cost of the retire-
rn ent benefit. By excluding the survivorship factor for the worker under
65, the tax accumulation at 65 is to that extent overstated, and the size of
the grant is to the same extent dirninished.
In addition to the basic assllffiptions described in the foregoing, cer-
tain technical assumptions are enw'l'lerated below:
1. The worker enters the labor force on January 1 of the year he
begins work, workS continuously until December 31 of the year
he retires, and is covered continuously by OASI while he works.
No account is taken of possible periods of unemployment. If
unemployment were taken into account, the size of the grant
woul.d be increased.
2. Each worker retires on his 65th birthday (December 31). If
the worker is rnarried, it is assumed that his spouse is also 65
on the same date.
3. Taxes paid by the spous e and benefits to which she would be en-
titled on her own earnings! history are not included in our cal-
culations of the present value of accmnulated taxes and the
present value of future benefits; however, l'eference is D:1adeto
the effect of these tax payrnents in a later section of this paper.
4. Benefit cOlnputations for retirees utilize estiIY1ates of present
Inortality rates, which are assurned to rernain constant over
the lifetirne of CLn-rent reti rees. Irnprovement in rnortality, a
distinct possibility, would increase the value of the grant.
5. Employer and ernployee taxes are included in the value of ac-
cumulated OASI contributions. If the employer'S portion of the
16
payroll tax is partly, or fully, shifted forward to the cost of
his product or service rather than ba ckwa r d to the worker as
a wage cost, the value of the a ccurnuIa te.d taxes would be re-
duced and the value of the grant would be increased.
Tables I through XI, which follow, are calculated on the foregoing
assurnptions and will dernonstrate t.h a.t by taxing the active workers to
pay the pensions of the retired workers, the social s ecur it y system pro-
duces not only intergenerational grants but also grants of different arn ount s
to groups within the sarn e generation. The Appendix to this paper con-
ta.i n s the accLLlTIulationdetail which is basic to the Tables included in the
text.
Between the Rich and the Poor
It is generally conceded that the social security tax is regressive
when measured only against total individual Inc orne without regard to
future benefits. However, as Robert J. lVlyers points out: lilt is not
siunificant that the overall tax rate for people earning above the taxable
-0 .
base is lower than for those below the base, because there are no benefit
;-:;:
rights created above the ba se !',
Table I on the next page a s surne s that the total retirernent benefit
to both rich and poor is a grant and that the Low Welge earner receives a
larger grant in proportion to salary than does the high wage ca r rie r ,
The subsequent Table, Table II, allows that the a.ccurnulat cd taxes
to date of retirernent a r e an offset against the total value of the benefit.
The tax a ccurnula tion is a s surn ed to be an insured benefit, and only
the net difference is a grant. T'her efo re, Table I shows gross grant; Table
II shows net grant.
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TABLE I -- Gross Grant Value of
OASI Retirement Benefits at Age 65, as of 1/1/74
(in dollars)
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average Prirnary Vahle at Retirernent Date of Retirern. Benefits (b)
Monthly InsLlrancra
) Ma r r ied Single Sing1e
Incorne Arn ount M65-F65 M65 F65
100 120.80 26,480 15,900 18,500
200 171. 40 37,570 22, 570 26,250
300 214.40 46,990 28,230 32,840
400 259.00 56,770 34,100 39,670
500 299.40 65,620 39,420 45,860
750 304.90 66,830 40, 140 46,700
1,000 304.90 66,830 40, 140 46,700
2,500 304.90 66,830 40, 140 46,700
(a) The Primary Insurance Arn ount shown in Col. (2) is the basic
unit of OASI c ove r age determined ta.bu.lar Iy for the corresp()nd-
ing unit of Average Monthly Wage.
(b) The value at retirement date has been developed by mu iti pl y-
ing the PIA by the single p r ern iurri anriui ty factor for rna r r ied
male 65 benefit, Ceil (3), and for single rna l e 65 benefit,
Col. (4). The rnortality table employed was the U. S. Popula-
tion Table, with projection Scale B for rnor ta.lity irri pr overri cnt
and 30/0interest. Col. (3) a s surn e s spouse benefit at 50110 of
worker benefit.
It is apparent frorn the above Table that the grant is of con s ider ablc
vallie, ranging from $15,900 to $40,140 for single male, horn :~18,500
to $46,700 for single fernale, and from $26,480 to $66,830 fur the
rnarried rrra Le , Since the benefits are not in direct proportic)l1 to thc a v c r >
age wage, it can be concluded that the ratio of the grant is greater t: th.:
10w incon"1e ern pl ove e .
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TABLE II -- Net Grant Value
(Net of employer-employee contributions)
OASI Retirement benefits at Age 65, as of 1/1/73
(in dollars)
( 1) (2) (3 )
Average
Monthly
Income
Gross Value from Table I
Married Single
M65-F65 M65
100
200
300
400
500
600
750
1,000
2,500
.26,480 15,900
37,570 22,570
46,990 28,230
56,770 34, 100
65,620 39,420
66,830 40, 140
66,830 40,140
66,830 40, 140
66,830 40, 140
( 4) (5 ) (6)
Net Grant Value
Accurnulated Married Single
Contributi~ns(a) M65-F65 M65
2,920 23,560 12, 980
5,840 31,730 16,730
8,340 38,650 19,890
9,980 46,790 24,120
10,780 54,840 28,640
11,480 55,350 28,660
11,980 54,850 28,160
12,130 54,700 28,010
12,130 54, 700 28,010
(a) The accurnulated contributions shown in Col. (4) represent
the combined ac curnu.lat.i on at 3% intere st of the ernploye r
and em p l ov e e contributions, a s s urn ing that taxable earnings
have been level at the am ourit s shown in Col. (1).
Even after allowing for the a c c urn ul.at e d contributions, tbe r e is
still a substantial grant to the retired under the OASI prograrn. The
arnount of the net grant maxirnizes near the $600 average rn orith l v in-
c orne level and rernains approxirnately constant thereafter.
The lack of proportionality between the; reb rorn ent benefits and
the contributions indicate a weighting in benefit dollars in favor of the
lower i.nc orn e wage e a r ne r , For a rn a r r ied r e c ipi e nt., the ratio of total
arant, Col. (2), to accurnulatecl contributions is 9:1 at $100 average
b
n'1onthly income, about 5.6: 1 at $300 per rnonth, about 6: 1 at $500, and
approxirnately the s a.rn e thereafter.
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There is another grant aspect of OASI (in this case from the low
wage earner to the high wage earner) that has received relatively little
attention. We refer specifically to the Federal Iricorn e Tax (FIT) treat-
rnerr of social security retirement benefits.
The charity concept evident in the pattern of Suprerne Court
rulings, starting with the first decision bearing on the constitutionality
of the original Social Security Act (previously refer-red to), is r efl ect ed
in the r-easoning of the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS considers
the social security benefits as tax exernpt because they corne within the
scope of the tax law exempting f r orn taxation "t.he value of property ac-
qui r ed by gifel (1. T. 3447 Cumulative Bulletin 1941-1, p. 191),
In a 1025 page report on the June 1958 Social Secl~rityHearings,
there is a noteworthy mention of the incorne tax aspects of the progran'l.
Peter G. Dirr, appearing as a rn ernbe r of the Social Security Committee
of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, rrrade this
recornrnendation on behalf of the Association:
We recommend that study be given to the feasibility of (1)
permitting deduction of OASI contributions on personal in-
~on'le tax returns, and (2) requiring that benefits received
be included in taxable inc orn e.
With an increasing nurnb e r of persons collecting OA,_)I
benefits, rria.n y beneficiaries are given an unneeded and
undesirable tax advantage to the det r irn ent of the revenue
needs of the country.
Making OASI benefits taxable would not affect those whose
principal income on retiren'lent is the OASI benefit, since
individuals age 65 and over have the advantage of double
1 . Ivpe rsona exemptlons.
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As the foregoing quotation indicates, under the Internal Revenue
Code, social security contributions of ernpl oye e s and the self-ernployed
are paid f r orn taxable income (i. e., they are not deductible from gross
income); employer contributions are deductib~e as a business expense;
investrnent income of the social security trust funds is tax free and all
social security benefits are tax ex ernpt ,
The tax t r eatrn ent of a qualified pension plan is exactly the sa.rne ,
except that benefits in excess of ernployee contributions are included in
,
taxable incOlne (and except for the tax on investrnent inc orne paid by life
insUTance corripa.rries as sociated with insured pension plans).
A pr iva te , qualified pension plan is usually conside r ed sel f-
supporting, even though some rrrav argue that the deferred taxation irrr-
plicit in the tax treatrnent described above does involve a tax subsidy
f r orri general revenues since the personal i.ncorn e tax bracket aft c r re-
tirement is expected to be lower than that applicable when contributions
are made and investment inc orn e is earned. Whatever position is taken,
it s eern s clear that the more favorable tax t r ea.trri ent of OASI benefits
does indeed result in a subSidy f rorn general revenues. Hence, it
should be recognized that the socia l secu r it y financing systern is not
self-supporting in the sa.rne sense that private prograrns pay their own
way.
In The Proceedings, Volurne VI, of the Conference of Actuaries
in Public Practice, Robert J. Myers has this to say regarding the
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financing basis and policy of the OAS::JIsystem at the time of the 1950
Amendments:
Congress was of the belief that the program should be com-
pletely self- supporting from contributions of covered indi-
viduals and employers and accordingly repealed the pro-
vision permitting appropriations to the sy~tem_ from general.
revenue s. In subseqltent arnencbnents, thi s policy continued.'}
This quotation requires restatement that (recognized or not) the
rnor e favorable tax treatrnent of OASI benefits does indeed result in a
subsidy frorn general revenues. ,
Under a conl.pulsory national old-age prograrn designed to rneet a
social need for a basic floor of protection, it seernS s t r ange indeed
for older persons in the higher income categories to receive a tax-
free benefit. That part of our national income compulsorily devoted
to social purposes could well be better employed.
In exarnining the financial effects of tax- exernption of benefits, it
is illuminating to have s orrie illustrative figures as to the value of the
social security subsidy.
The following Table III will show that the financial advantage of
tax- exernption repres ents a fur th er bounty Ior the higher inconl.e cate-
gories.
It will be seen that when the effe ct of FIT is considered, there is
a considerable gl'ant to the rich, over and above the benefit grant.
There is no such tax grant to th e very poor, and only a rnadest tax
grant to the lniddle incorne levels.
22
TABLE III - - F. I.T. Grant under OASI
(in dollars)
MARRIED: ENTRY AGE 28 in 1937: RETIREMENT at AGE 65 in 1974
Average
Monthly
Iric orn e
( 1)
100
300
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
Accumulated
Value of
Employee
Value of Value of Tax Net Value Net Contl'ibution
for OA Benefit
after Credit for
Tax Exemption
(2) - (5)
( 6)
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1,460
4, 754
(2,180)
(2,323)
(5,120)
(14,419)
(25,297)
The value of FIT pa vrn ent s , col. (3), is the product of the accu-ie.)
mulated contributions, col. (2), and the marginal tax bracket
corresponding to the average incorne before retirernent.
The value of tax exemption, col. (4), is the product of the Re-
tirement Grant, Table 1, and the marginal ta~Li)racket after
retirement corresponding to the average inCOIY1ebefore retire-
ment.
JOINT TAX RATES
before Reb rem cnt after Retircn"lcnt
FIT on (a) Exemption 0t ' of Tax
ACCLimulated OA Benefits b) Exemption
(4) - (3)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
1,460 ° 0 04, 170 584 0 (584)
5,390 862 8,432 7,570
6,065 1,334 9,722 8,388
6,065 2, 183 13,368 11,185
6,065 3,214 23,698 20,484
6,065 3,882 35,244 31,362
(a)
(b)
(c) The rnarginal tax rates ernployecl are as shown below:
Av. lVlonthly Incorne
100
300
500
1, 000
2,500
5,000
10,000
0 0
14 °16 14
22 16
36 22
53 39
64 58
Between Married and Single
and
Between Working and Non-working Wives
The social security program is constructed in such a way that two
male participants, A and B, can each start wor~ at the same age and in
the sa.rne year, receive identical annual salaries, pay identical payroll
taxes, and retire at the same age and in the same year. Yet if one is
single while the other is rna r r ied (with a non-working wife), the rnar-
ried participant will receive rnonthly retirement benefits of one and
one half times those received by the single participant.
TABLE IV - - Grant Value
(Net of employe r- ernployee contributions)
OASI Retirement Benefits at Age 65, as of 1/1/74
(in dollars)
( 1) (2) (3 )
Average Gross Value from Table I
Monthly Married Single
Income M65-F65 M65
100
200
300
400
500
600
750
1,000
2,500
26, L180 15,900
37,570 22,570
46,990 28,230
56,770 34,100
65,620 39,420
66,830 40, 140
66,830 40, 140
66,830 40,140
66,830 40,140
(4) (5) (6)
Net Grant Value
Accumulated( )Married Single
Contributions a M65-F65 M65
2,920 23,560 12,980
5,840 31,730 16,730
8,340 38,650 19,890
9,980 46,790 24,120
10,780 54,840 28,640
11,480 55,350 28,660
11,980 54,850 28,160
12, 130 54, 700 28,010
12,130 54,700 28,010
(a) The accurnulated contributions shown in c ol urnn (4) represent
the cornbined accmnulation at 30/0 interest of the ernployer and
employee contributions, assurning that taxable earnings have
been level at the arn ount s shown in column (1).
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The foregoing Table illustrates that for an average rnonthly Income
of $500, the net grant value to the married participant is $54,840 as corrl-
pared to a net grant value to the single participant of $28, 640--a ratio of
almost 2 to l--a substantial grant from the single to the rrra r r ied ,
The preceding Table IV has assumed no tax contribution from the
wife. However, most wives have worked for vvages and have contributed
taxes at sorn e t irn e during their adult lives. Nevertheless, unless a
married wornan's mean taxable wage exceeds, on the average, 30% of her
husband's mean taxable wage, she will receive the sarn e benefit as the
wife who had not worked at all and, thus, receive no benefit whatsoever tn
return for social security taxes paid. Therefore, at the lower end of the
wa ze scale because of the progressiveness of the rrri rrirn urn benefit ($93.80)
co
to anyone with an average rn orrthl v wage of less than $75.00, it becornes
an advantage f'o r husband and wife to file as single participants, even if
the wife's average wage is very low. With thi s one exc epti on noted, t.h e
working wife with rn ean wages on the average 30% below her hu sba nd l s is
discriminated against.
For example, if a male worker retires with an average rnunLbly
wage of $300 and dies shortly thereafter, his widow will receive rctire-
ment benefits la r ger than the pension to which she would have been cn-
titled in her own right, unless she had worked and r ecei vcd an a vcr age
wage of $300 or IT10re pel' month.
The working wife rn a y suffer other inequities in cornparison with
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the non-working wife. A married worker retiring at age 65 with a $400
average monthly wage, whose wife never worked, will receive a larger
pension ($388.50) than would two single workers retiring at age 65, one
with a $400 average monthly wage and the other wi th a $107 monthly wage
($387.80). If the second of these two workers is assumed to be the work-
ing wife of the first, rather than assuming both to be single, the inequity
between working and non-worl<:ing wives becornes clear.
An interesting analysis of ben,eiits available from taxes paid is de-
vel oped in Table V below. Here it is assurned that the average family in-
corn e (total of average rn al e plus average female) is the same whether one
works or both work. We have then noted the shift in benefits as the ratio
of wage varies between the husband and 'Nife.
TABLE V
Comparison of Benefit Paym.ents
as Ratio of Wages Varies between Husband and Wife
(in dollars)
Family
Total
Average
Taxes Single Male
Maxirnurn
Monthly Husband's Wife's
Paid +
Married Farnily
Wage Share Share
to 65 Single Fern.
Benefit Benefit
400 400 - 0
- 9980
259.00 388.50 388.50
400 360 40
9980 334.70
361. 35 361.35
400 320 80
9980 321. 80
336.45 336.45
400 280 120
9980 343. 10
309.30 343. 10
400 240 160
9980 343. 10
284.85 343.10
400 200 200
9980 342.80
257.10 342.80
Table V shows that at no ratio of wages between hllsba
nd
and wife
is the retirement benefit as great as when farnily income is deri vcd fr orn
one wage earner. 26
Between
Self- Employed and Employer- Employed
A third source of inequity is the fact that the total contributions
made by self-ernployed are considerably less than those made on behalf
of the ernployer- ernployed worker. The directidn of the inequity depends
on whether and how the ern pl oy er l s share of the social security contribu-
t.i on is shifted.
If it could be as surn ed that no part of the burden of the employe r I s
tax is shifted, then a s elf'<ern pl oyed person pays in a pp r oxi.rna.t eIy half
again as rrru ch as an employer- employed person at the s arn e wage level.
If, however, it is allowed that the full amount of the employer's tax is
shifted to the employee, then the inequity is in the other dir ec ti cri. The
following Tables assume the latter and rriea sur e the grant f r orri the em-
ployer- ernployed to the s eIf - ern p.loved ;
TABLE VI
Net Grant to Married Recipients - Employed vs Self- Employed
(in dollars)
GTOSS Value Contributions Net G r a n t Val u e
Average _of Benefits
Wage M65 - F65 Ernployed Self- Employed Ernploycd Sclf- Ern pl oved
100 26,480 2,920 1,690 23,560 24,790
200 37,570 5,840 3,390 31,730 34,180
300 46,990 8,340 5,080 38,650 41,910
400 56,770 9,980 6,440 46,790 50,330
500 65,620 10,780 7, 120 5~l:,840 58,500
600 66,830 11,480 7,710 55,350 59,120
750 66,830 11,980 8, 130 54,850 58,700
1,000 66,830 12,130 8,260 54,700 58,570
2,500 66,830 12,130 8,260 54,700 58,570
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TABLE VII
Net Grant to Single Male Recipient - Employed vs Se1£-Employed
(in dollars)
Gros s Value Contributions Ne t Gran t Va 1u e
Average of Benefits
Wage Male 65 Employed 5e1£-Employed Ernployed 5e1£-Ernployed
100 15,900 2.,920 1,690 12,980 14,210
200 22,570 5,840 3,390 16,730 19,180
300 28,230 8,340 5,080 19,890 23, 150
400 34,100 9,980 6,440 24, 120 27,660
500 39,420 10,780 7, 120 28,640 32,300
600 "10,140 11,480 7,710 28,660 32,430
750 40,140 11,980 8, 130 28,160 32,010
1,000 40, 140 12, 130 8,260 28,010 31,880
2,500 40, 140 12,130 8,260 28,010 31,880
As can be seen from Tables VI and VII, the grant to s eIf c ernp.loye d
exceeds that to ernployer-ernployedby $1,230 for recipients with average
rnonthly wages of $100; the size of the grant difference increases with in-
creasing wage, reaching approxirnately $3,800 at the $600 pel' month aver-
age wage, and rernaining there for all higher wage levels.
It should be noted that s el.f-cer'npl oye d were not covered uride r the
social security prograrn until 1951, whereas enl.ployer-ernployed have been
contri but or s since 1937. Inasrnuch as the cmTIulati ve corit r ibu tion s shown
in Tables V1 and VII include taxes paid since entry into the p.lan , an over-
statenl.ent of the size of the grant to s eIf c ernplove d r e su l t s , The differ-
ence between tax contributions f r orn 1937 to 1951 represents an adcliti ona l
grant to the late covered. Although not shown in the Tables, the alTJOLUlt
of this grant would approxirnate $400 for the $100 wage level, $800 for the
$200 wage level, and $1000 for all higher wage levels.
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An earlier section of this paper c ornpa r e.d the effect of the Federal
Income Tax treatment of social security benefits and taxes with those of
other r et.i r ern erit systerns. It was noted that when dollar benefits were treated
without consideration of the effect of FIT, they were found to be progres-
sive in favor of the poor, but that when the effect of FIT was considered,
there was found to be a considerable tax advantage to the retired wealthy
not available to the retired low wage earner with no significant incorne in
addition to a social security pension. Sim iIa r ly , there is an FIT ad vari-
tage to the retired self-ernployed; however, since his tax contribution is
greater, the value of FIT on accumulated contributions is greater, the
net value of tax exernption is less, and the net tax advantage to the retired
high incorne self-ernployed is less than that available to the high income
employer- ernployed.
Between Male and Fernale
For two workers, one male and the other f erri a l e , with the s arri c
wage history and sarne age, the social s ec ur itv law provides for the sarn e
rnonthly benefit after retirernent (except for the tern po r a r y distinction dis-
cussed in the next paTagraph).
PriOl" to the 1972 revision of the social security law, there was a
mzrked difference in the c1etc:rniinatior of fully in s u r ed status and in the
cornputation of average wage for rnalescomparecl with fernales. This ce-
sulted in advantages to wornen and to those xetiring in 1974 as great as
$11 in excess of the rnonthly retirem.ellt benefit to rnen.l~ With the en a.cr-
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ment of the 1972 revisions, these discriminations are being phased out
and by 1978 will be completely gone.
Table VIII below has disregarded the daff e r enc e s between rnale and
f ern.a.le just referred to and has assumed that the sa.rne wage lThiDlYwould pl'O-
due e the same average monthl y wage and the same PIA (prilnary insurance
arnount). The Table shows, however, that because of the more favorable
life expectancy of f errraIe s , the present value of the beneJit to females at
age 65 is substantially better than that of rna.le s . Since the accumulated
contribution is the same, the grant to f ern a.le s is greater than the grant to
lTIales--by $2,600 at the low incorne levels and by $6,560 at high income
levels.
( 1)
TABLE VIII
Grant Values, Male and Female, Age 65
. (in dollars)
(2) (3) (4). (b)
Prilnary Value at Ret. Date of Ret. Benehts
Insurance
Amount (a) M65 F65
Average
Monthly
Inc 0 In e
100
200
300
400
500
750
1,000
120.86
171. 40
214.40
259.00
299.40
304.90
304.90
15,900
22,570
28,230
34, 100
39,420
40, 140
40,140
18,500
26,250
32,840
39,670
45,860
46, 700
46,700
(a) The PIA, shown in col. (2), is the basic unit of OAl coverage
deterrnined tabularly for the corresponding a ve r age rnonthly WLlL!;e.
(b) The value at retirement date, (3) and (4), has been cle\-elopcd by
rriuIt iplyi ng the pIA by the single p r em iurn annuity factors for
single rria.le 65 and for single female 65. The mortality table
ern p.love.d was the US Population Table with projections scale B
and 3% interest.
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The foregoing Table VIII shows the grant effect of the mortality dif-
ference between male and f erri a l e at age 65. For those retiring before
age 65, the grant effect in favor of females is slightly less. For those
delaying retirement past age 65, the difference is modestly increased.
Table IX which follows shows single premium annuity factors for
rri a I.e and female at various ages and shows the r a.ti o of the grant in favor
of the female.
TABLE IX
Male vs Female Annu it v Factors
A e
Single Premium Annuity
per $1 of Retirem. Bener.
Male Female
Ratio of Grant
Female /Male
62
64
65
66
68
70
72
147.69
137.60
132.S8
127.61
117.94
108.49
99.30
170.32
159.70
154.25
148.78
137.74
126.65
l1S.84
1. 155
1, 161
1. 163
1. 166
1. 168
1. 167
1. 166
1951 Group Annuity Table, 3% rnt.e r e st .
Between Early and Norrnal Retirernents
The law contains special reduction provisions applicable to retire-
rri ent benefits cornrnencing prior to age SS. Under such provisions, the
social security benefit is reduced 5/9 01 1% for each month prior to age
65 for which benefits are paid. If a worker chooses retirement at age 62
(36 months before age 6S), his benefit will be reduced by 20% (5/9 x 36 x 1%)
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On the basis of the social security law as presently applicable, and
assurning rrra.xirnurn contributions for the Game time period, rna.xirnurn
,1
rnonthly retirement benefits for 1974 retirees would be as follows:
M65
F65
304.90
316.30
M62
, F62
240.90
244.00
The above figures reflect the effect of the rnale/fernale inequity
(mentioned in the preceding part of this Section) which is being phased
out. If this effect were already phased out, the figures would be:
M and F, age 65 - $316.30 M and F, age 62 - $244.00 (80% of
304.90)
The computation formula of the law uses the curnulative salary for
the highest salaried years for the riurn ber of years from 1950 to age 62
less 5. Hence, for two individuals, one 65 and the other 62, retiring in
1974, the fo rrn ul.a will include a longer salary period for the age 62 re-
tiree than for the age 65 retiree.
,ze
When the single premiurn annuity factors are applied to the above
rnaXlmum benefits, the present vaIu e of future benefits for the age 65
rnale retiree is $41,935 and for the age 62 rnale retiree it is $36,036.
Since the same tax contribution for the sarrie period is assLuTIcd for both,
there is a r-esulti rrg grant of $5,899 rnor e to the norm a.l retiree than to
the early retiree.
.Ario the r approach would be to a s surn e two workers, both the SalTIC
age, with the sarne wage history, with one retiring at age 62 in 1974 and
the other retiring at age 65 in 1977. If we allow that the 1974 tax rate
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of 4.30/0 for OAI and rriax.i.rriurn taxable wage base of $13,200 both r ern a.in
constant through 1977, and that the benefit formula is the same in 1977,
then we have:
TABLE X
CompaTative Costs and Benefits
EaTly Retirement vs No r rnaI Ret i r ern ent
(in dollars)
A
B
(2 ) ,(3) (4) (5)
Accumulated Pre sent Value of
Retirernent Taxes- Benefits Future Benefits
Age Year PIA (a) Age 65 (b) Age 65
62 In 1974 244 4,074 32,120
65 In 1977 360 16,763 47,390
( 1)
Wo rk e r
(a) The significant d'iff e r enc e in the PLA.repr e s ent s (1) the substitution
in the computational for rn ul a for the 1977 r eti r ee of 3 years of tax-
able income at $13,200 (1974, 1975 and 1976) for 3 years of taxable
in corrie at $4,200 (1956, 1957 and 1958), and (2) the reduc ti on factor
of 200/0for the early retiree.
(b) Tax pa yrn ent s a r e accumulated to 1977 at 30/0interest. Benefit pay-
ments are accurn uIa t ed to 1977 at 3% interest. Survivorship proba-
bility is igno r ed , The difference between accurnu lat ed taxes and
benefits is shown in co1urnn (4).
(c) Present value factors are for Male 65, US Population Table, pro-
jection B, 30/0interest.
Table X shows a rerna.rrung grant value to the early retirees at age 65
of $28,046 and a grant value to the normal retiree of $30,627.
It should be noted that the taxable income assumed for years 1974
through 1976 was $13, 200--the amount which became effective on January
1, 1974. 1£ $10,800 had been used (the last taxable income level common
to both parties), the PIA to the norrnal retiree would be $344, the aCCllmll-
lated taxes would be $16,125, and the value of future benefits would be
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$45,290. The grant value to the normal retiree would be reduced to
$29,165, still reflecting a modest grant in favor of the normal retiree.
In the exarn pl e s given, survivorship has been ignored. Since it is
equally applicable to both parties before the early retirement date and
after the rio r m a.I r-e ti r erri erit date, its effect during those periods can be
disregarded. The effect of the s u r vi vo r sh.ip benefit in the interval between
early retirement and age 6.5 would accrue to the advantage of the early re-
ti re e.
Between Normal and Late Retirernent
Although the law p r ovi de s an a c tua r ia l ly compensating reduction in
benefits for early retirees, no such cornpensating increase in benefits is
available for late retirees. (There has been, since the 1972 revision of
the law, an increase of 1/12 of 1% per rn orith for each m onth between 65
and 72, for which the worker does not receive any benefits. Howeve r ,
this increase scarcely qualifies as an a ctua r ia l l y equivalent adjustrncnL.)
Instead, the law permits the retired over-65 wo r k e r to receive full re-
tirernent benefits, providing his earlings do not exceed $2400 per year.
1£ his taxable wages exceed $2400, his retiTcrnent benefit is reduced ~;l
for each $2 of taxable wages. ':'
The retiree with an average rn oritb l y wage of $200 or less, who CO)1-
tinues to wo rk at the same wage after r eti r ern ent suffers no reduction in
benefits.
':' This earnings restriction applies only until age 72. Above 72
there is no benefit disqualification for earnings in any arllOunt.
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The retiree with an average rnonthly income in excess of $200, who
continues to work at the same wage after retirement will lose $1 of benefit
for each $2 of taxable income in excess of $200 per rnonth. If the retiree
is single, then he or she could continue to have ta.xabl e wages of $800 be-
fore losing all of the benefit. If the retiree is married, taxable wages
would have to amount to $1100 before los s of all of tbe reti r ern erit 'benefit.
The following Table XI illustrates the net effect of post retirement
taxable wages at various levels.
TABLE XI
Effect of Excess Income on Re ti r ern ent Benefits between 65 and 72
(in dollars)
(1)
Average
Monthly
Income
(2) (3) (4)
Single Eetiree (a)
(5) (6) (7)
Married Rctiree(b)
Basic Effect of NetBasic Effect of Net
Benefit Excess Benefit Benefit Excess Benefit
100 120.80 0 120.80 181.20 0 181.20
200 171.40 0 171.40 257.10 0 257.10
300 214.40 50 164.40 321. 60 50 271. 60
400 259.00 100 159.00 388.50 100 288.50
500 299.40 150 149.40 449. 10 150 299.10
600 304.90 200 104.90 457.35 200 257.35
800 304.90 300 4.90 457.35 300 157.35
1,000 304.90 30-'1.90 0 -157.35 4f)0 57.35
1,200 304.90 304.90 0 .:157.35 457.35 0
(a) The arri ou rit shown in Col. (2) 1 co the PLA.dete rm i.n ed tabularly for_0
corresponding unit of average rnonthly wage.
(b) The amount shown in Col. (5) is 1 1/2 times that shown in Col. (2)
and reflects the 50% increase in benefit to married retirees.
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The social security law provides that wages received after retire-
rnent are subject to the regular payroll tax. Consequently, the working
retiree with income even at the exempt level (less than $2400)--though he
has no loss in benefit--is contributing more for h~s social s ecu r-it v pen-
sion than the non-working retiree; obviously, if his earnings go above
the exempt level, the working retiree sur r end.er s part of his benefit; and,
as shown in Table XI, at the level of $800 per month if single and $1100
per rnonth if married, he not only pays the current social security tax,,
but loses all of his retirernent benefit for as long as these circumstances
prevail. It is evident, therefore, that there is a grant at each wage level
in favor of the over 65 fully retired.
In describing the evolution of the financing of the social security
system, Actuarial Study #49 reads:
As is often the case in this country, the answer was arrived at
through a pragmatic political process rather than a theoretical
philosophical process. And, as is also often the case, the
pragmatic process has resulted in an answer which has to date,
at least, worked out satisfactorily. 21
The underlining of "t o date 11 has been added to call attention to the
fact that even when the retirement computational for rnula incorporates
a particular practical purpose by deSign, the value of the purpose is apt
to be distorted by changing circurnstances. For instance, the greater
grant to the early retiree is a fall-out from the effort to encourage full
retirement of the elderly during a tirne of rapid popu-
lation expansion to rnake r o om for the great antici-
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pated influx of the young. But circumstances do alter cases. The country
now approaches zero population growth with the concomitant result that
young entrants into the system face the prospect of supporting an ever-
growing nurnber of retired workers--prime evidence of the intergenera-
tional character of the social security pension systern and prime evidence,
as well, of its paradoxical nature.
Wh il e the nation struggles with a geriatric pr oblern and promotes
hobbies and retirernent horn e s to arn eIi or a te it, a partial soIut ion lies in
eliminating the penalties for after-65 gainful employment. Writing in
1968, Peckman, Aaron and Tausig observed that the cost of social se-
curity "varies greatly with the relative size of the r et.i r ed population" and
that measures to reverse the trend of autornatic r eti r ern errt at a particular
age, regardless of capabilities, should be given serious consideration.
The authors suggested two alternative method s for accor_nplishing
this purpose: first, ex erript aged work er s f r orn the payroll tax; or,
second, pay permanently increased benefits, i. e , delayed l'etirernent
A.J.
credits to persons who work past age 65. Since the ernpl.oy er of the over-
age work e r is also liable for the payroll tax, the first Hiethod would be
inconsistent with the objective of universal applicability of the payroll
tax and might also be prejudicial to the young. The second rncthoci, how-
ever, has the merit of introducing a valid insurance concept. It givl's the
worker the opportunity of choosing either a present benefit with wage yc_;-
strictions or a deferred increased benefit. It wouId eliminate the penalty
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iITlposed on those who choose late r-eti r erri errt by providing thern the oppor-
tunity of rna.krng an actuarially equivalent exchange. It would also have
the appropriate result of reducing the grant from the late retired to the
early .r et i r e.d by encouraging the time honored American work ethic.
Mentioned earlier was the increased benefit provided by the 1972
law for those between age 65 and 72, who defer .r c ti r ern cn t , This In-
crease arn cu nt s to 10/0pel' year. An actuarial equivalent would average
rn o r e than 100/0for each yea r of d ef e rral.
Although the 10/0pe l' year inc r ern ent is of little benefit when con-
sidered alone, when cornbined with the effect of higher inc orne during the
deferTed period, it results in a significantly increased PIA andlYlay be
an inducement for deferring retirernent.
Take, for exarn p.l.e, the case of an individual whose a.rmua l wa.ge
level is, and has been, at the rn a.xirn urn taxable wage level. If he / she had
retired at age 65 on January 1, 1974, the PIA would have been $27-1. 60 jf
rria l e and $28L1. 90 if f ern a l.e ; if allowance is rna d e for the effect of the
1974 benefit increases, the PIA would now be $304.90 for male and $316.30
for fernale. The d iff c r eric e between rn a l e ariel f cm a l e benefit is d ue to an
i.ne qui tv which is being phased out. Af't e r the phase out, the rn a l e com-
putation will be the same as the female; so, for purposes of c om pa r i s on ,
only the female benefit at 65 of $316.30 will be used. If the w o r k e r de-
f e r r ed r e ti r ern erit to age 66, the PIA would inc r ea s e to $342.30 ($338.90
p lu s the 10/0delayed Tetirernent credit of $3.40). If the w or k c r deferred
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retirement to age 67, the PIA would be $368.00 ($360.80, plus 2% de-
layed retirement credit of $7.20). If the wo rk e r deferred retirement to
age 72 and all other factors rernained constant du r ing the 7 ve a r period,
the PIA at age 72 would be $449.60 ($420.20, plus 7% delayed retirement
credit of $29.40).
Whether such def e r r a I of retirem_ent is advant 3?, s..u s to the re-
tiree will depend on many factors other than the equivalent rnonetary
values of the alt e r-na.tive s , However, limiting consideTation only to the com-
pa r a.tive figures, deferred retirernent is not desirable.
FOT example, during a one y ea r deferral (f r orn 65 to 66), the worker
would lose a benefit totaling $3,795.60 ($316.30 x 12), would have p;~jroll
taxes totaling $1135.20 ($567.60 from him and the same amount horn his
ernployer), and would be entitled to a benefit increase at age 66 of $26. 00
per month, the present value of which at age 66 would be $3,341.00. Sub-
tracting the increase in benefit value f r orn the total of taxes paid and
benefits deferred, there results a penalty for deferral of approximately
$1,600.00.
The foregoing exa rnpl e s assurned the 10/0delayed retirernent credit
now available. 1£ an actuarial equi va l ent of 10% were a s s urned for each
year of delay, the situation wouId be reversed, and there would be a re-
ward of about $1,600 per year of delayed r-et.ir em ent ,
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SECTION V
OTHER GRANT ELEMENTS
In addition to the measured major grants in the social security re-
t.i r em ent program, there are also the following gr?lnt effects inherent in
the formula structure for deterrnining social security retirement benefits:
Grant Effect of Differences in Coverage Dates
Some workers have had coverage under social s ecur it y since its
inception. Others, originally excluded because of job classification or
other reasons, have been covered for a shorter period. The latecomers
to coverage receive a windfall. They have been free of tax payrn ent s for
as long as twenty years, yet are entitled to the same benefit as those who
have paid taxes from the beginning. The result has been a grant in favor
of the late covered. Now that practically all workers a r e social security
participants, this particular source of inequity will disappear. Neverthe-
less, there win remain grant effects resulting f r orri differences in the Late
coverage dates of those with advanced schooling compared to those who
enter the labor force at the earliest date the law al1ows:
For instance, those with advanced schooling, e spccia ll y college and
graduate schooling, will enter the work force at a later date than those
with lirnited schooling and thus be subject to the payroll tax for a sho rt cr
period of tirne; the low starting-wage years of the acadernical1y quali-
fied will be offset by periodic increases which will not accrue in the same
degree or with the same regularity to the unskilled and uneducated. Since
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the social security computational Fo rrn ula provides for the exclusion of
the early years of lowest salary, the well educated, well paid latecomer
to the program receives a more favorable grant than does the lower paid,
uneducated.
Grant Effect of Increasing Wage Levels
In the cornputation of Primary Insurance Arn ount , earnings since
1950 have far greater weight than wages earned in prior years. As a
rna.tt.er of fact, earnings In early wO~'king vea r s are alrn ost irrelevant rn
computing benefits - - even though they provided the basis of the tax pa )'-
ments.
For exarn pl e , a worker who has been covered since 1937 and has
had a taxable wage consistent with the rnaxi.rnurn taxable wage wouId have
averaged $4,600 per year over the thirty-seven years of the prograrn.
For benefit cornputation purposes, only the last sixteen years will bo In-
cluded, and the participant will be entitled to a r e t i r e.ment benefit of
$282 per rnonth. At the sarn e tirn e , another work c r with a constant wagc
of $4,500 per year will be entitled to a benefit of only $226 per rnonth.
This inequity results frorn the fact that wo rker s in jobs r cquirmg
particular skills start at relatively low wages, but as they becorne rnor c
proficient their wages tend to increase rather steadily up to r eti r crn cnt ,
On the other hand, s errri-skiLl ed and unskilled workers reach an early
peak in wages, usually about age 40, and thereafter wages tend to r erriain
level or decline . Consequently, though total curn ulat ive wages rri ay be
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approxirnately the same, the skilled worker will generally fare better at
",3
retirement. These circumstances imply a grant.
Grant Effect of Unemployment Periods
Recent social security statistics indicate that the sy stern provides a
disproportionate benefit to workers with extended periods of unernploy-
2lt 1 . '-1 f . . 65 .ment. For exarn p e, In t .ie case 0 wornen r eti r ing at In 1974, only
the high fifteen of the twent y-zb r ee years smc e 1950 will be counted In
the wage computational f or rnula , Hence, although SOHleof the women in
this category may ha ve had as rnany as eight years of low wage s, due to
long periods of u.nernpl.ovrnerrt , their r-ett r ern errt benefit couId be as high
as the benefit of the worker who was continuously ernployed. The ci r cnrn-
stances imply a grant.
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SECTION VI
SUMMAR Y AND EPILOGUE
The tax schedules set up in 1935 for financing the Social Security
Act were intended to rnak e the pension system. self-supporting and a ctu-
arially sourid , A large fund was to be built up, providing sufficient in-
terest a ccurn uIa.tion s to rnaintain benefit schedules. This a.ccurnuLa.t iori
of contributions was designed to be equal, at r eti r ern erit , to the present
value of future r eti r ern erit benefits. In other words, social security was
to be a true insurance pr og r arn with ccnt r ibut or y taxes serving as group
prem.iLUTIs. However, f r orn the outset the trend in cornputing benefiLs has
been to emphasize the need for, and adequacy of, the benefit in relation-
ship to whatever the CUY1'enteconornic and political envi r orrm ent , rather
than in r eIa.tion shi p to the arn ourit of contributions rrrade by or on behaH of
an individual employee or employer. The r e sul t ha s been to erode whc!.t-
eve'r insurance reserve had previously accurnul.ated and to convert the
system. to a gigantic intergenerational grant.
In this paper, we have shown that, even allowing that all tax contri-
butions are ac cum u'late d to retirement, they a r e grossly inadequate to
rrieet the cost of the r et i r errierrt benefit now provided. We have also shown
the system to be inequitable in its distribution of benefits between rnern bc r s
of the same retirernent generation.
VThatever insurance elernent r ern a.in s in the financing of the socia l
security pension prograrrl is not sufficient to justify its use as an actLl-
arially descriptive ter rn . '1'he benefit system of OAl is basically one of
welfare. Those now ernployed transfer income to those who are retired.
The only real justification for use of the term llinsurancell is philosophical
and lies in the good faith that the benefits pr ornised were intended to be
perrnanent and assured, and that the contributory principle, even as
presently applied, gives the contributors, as Franklin Roosevelt put it:
"the legal, rnor aI, and political right to collect their pensions 11
The social s ecu r i.tv retirement grants rnea su r ed and surnrna rized
In this paper can be subjectively assessed as either reasonable or urr-
reasonable, as either just or unjust; but, objectively, they can only be
assessed as random. and ha.phaza r d , If the social security sy s tern coul.d
explain itself, it rnight say as did Ha r r iet Beecher Stowe! s Topsy, "I
'spect I jes1 growed. Don't tbink nobody never rna.de rne." With sui tabLc
use of the facts presented in this paper, pe r-h aps the social securit y r c-
t.i r ernent sy s tern can be disciplined in its growth and restrained in its
an~lbitions; perhaps, at the very least, it will a.drnit to being what it is.
The words of Dr. Robert L. Miller, L. L. D., seem. a.ppr-opr iat c
to epilogue, if not to conclusion: "Nothing is wrung with rnakirrg OI_lI'
parents and grandparents better off, a s long as all of us are awar c of the
II 2.~-cost of doing so.
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APPENDIX
c. SELF EMPLOYED
TABLE OF MAXH.!U?\1 T-'\XABLE II~COME, TA.\: RATES, AJ\'D RESULTING OASI TAXES
U~DER OASDHI FOR YE.!\RS ll137 TI-m.ODell 1973
T a x a b.lc 0-,"\5J Dl
I I I CornLin'::c
UASI GA,SDI
Salz.Lry Ra t c
Rate H.2U
[{.:.ttL 'LeX T<.1x
(h
(1/ c: (a) 0'
0·' ~S
::::>
/(1 /0
,0
I')
c: (a).;.>
1';131-1950 ~OT
AVi\ILA BLE 'IO
SELF EMl-'LuYEU - - - -
1951-1953 3,600 2.25
2.25 S1. 00 81. 00
1954 -» 600 3.00
3.00 108.00 108.00
.),
1955-1956 4, 200 3.00
3.00 126.CJO 126.00
1957-1958 4, 200 3.00
375 3.375
126.00 141.75
1959 4,800 3.375
375 3.75
162.00 180.00
1%0-1961 4, 800
, 125 375
4.50 198.00 216.00
-t.
1962 --1:, 800 -'!c. 325
375 4.70
207.60 225.60
19(,>1965 4,800 S.025
·375 5.40
241. 20 259.20
1966 6,600 5.25 · 55
? ~ G. 15 346.::'0 382.80
• .J::>
1967 6,600 ::::J. 35 ·55
·50 6.40
353. 10 389.40
1968 7,800 J. 125
.675 .60 ().40
399.75 452.40
1969 7,800 S.625
.675 .60 6.90
438.75 491. 40
1970 7,800 5.5S
'(5 .CO 6.90
432..50 491. 40
1971 7,800 f~. 15
75 · tJ () 7.50
4T'), (0 538.20
1972 9,000 (.J. J 5
75 • C f) 7.50
553.SO 621. 00
1973 10,800 6.45
.55 1.OU 8.00
6')6.f)O 750.00
(a) The rate I o r disability in.",rancc was not 2"",Jeble wh',n these tablc'S w c r c fie·,t devdoped, and the
a een mula t cd c cnt r ibuti 0"" cncr! eyed in ,'.ppend ix ]) an d in the to xt of the pap'''' we r c the combin ,'0
contribution lew 0/\ '-;r and [)J.
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APPENDIX
D
1 o S 1
19 ~,2
1°:;,3
1 (J S4
1S. 55
1956
1957
1958
1959
19(;0
1961
1962
1 r) 6 3
1()64
1965
19Gb
IS'S7
1 r-j S8
1 (; (/)
1';170
1'771
1972
1 r) 73
SELF ElvlPLOYED
j\CCUlvlULiITED CONTRIBUTIONS (a) -- AT YEAR EFD 1951 TI-Lf<ODGH 1973
FOR SPECIFIED \L\GE LEVELS
r l-J N U A 1. W
P~GS LEYE L S
_[';. ~ .---------'
S 1, 200. 00 52, 400. 00
~r~3, 600. 00 c· SO~. 00 'I' ( (;00, 00 $7,
2 oo. 00 $9, ~OD, 00 $10, S( J. 00
y> -r , .p'--', and L -.:;_\1'
S 27. 00 54.
00
C" 819 00 c: 8L 00
r'" 81 00 $ C) 1 ~ 00 <;:
"
:~ ,_)
~~
8l. 00 s ~, ' 00_,J L -. ~
54. 81 109. 62
164. 4~ 1 tA" 43 164, 43
1 o-l , (I ') HA. 43 ll"~' 43
.• .J
-s: _)
8 CJ 45 1660 91
250. 36 250. 36
250,
.) ( 2S<). 36 250 . 36
36
_),
..)0
/ ~,--, ..
12l. 96 243. 91
365. 87
r", I h 87 365, 87 36S.
87 365. 87 3l ~~
87
_)O:J.
161. 62 323. 24
484. 86 :102. 85
S02. 85 S02. 85 502. 85
5 C2. 85
202. 47 404. 94
607. 41 643. 94 643. 94
6·13 . 94 643. 94
' , -- 94DC!~' •
2L1r9.04 ·198. 08
747. 12 805. 01
80S. 01 305. 01 805.
01 8e5. 01
297. 01 594. 02
891. 03 970. 91 970.
91 910. 91 970. 91 9 ~'J. 91
350. 92 701. 84 1, 052.
76 ; 180. 04
i 180. 04 1, 180. 04 1, 180.
04 1, 1:: ~. 04
- , - ,
415. 45 830. 90
1, 246. 35 1 ) 431.
44 1, .~31. 44 1,
431.44 1, 431. 44 1, 4.;<.
44
4B 1. 91 96 3~ 82
1, 445" 73
1 b90. 38 1, 690. 38
1 , 090. 38 1, 690. 38 1,
6s ~. 38
- )
~)52 . 77 1 105. 54
1, 658, 31
, 966. 69 1 , 966. 69 1, 966. 69
1, 966. 69 1, 9t,o. 69
L, - ,
634\1 15 1 268. 3D
1, 902. 45 2 28-1.
89
') 284. 89 2, 284. 89 2,
284. 8 ,) 2, 2~·L 89
- ,
, -,
71 7. 97 1, 435,
cH 2, 153. 91 Z, 612, 64
') CJ 12, C4 2, Ll2. 64 2, 61 Z. 64 2
I • '") 64
~,
, tJ .; ~.
804. 31 1, 608. 62
2, 412. 93
) '? 50. ZZ
.,) 950. 22 ) 9 J O. 22 2, 950.
22 2 u;;'''', 22
•., ~, -,
,
898. 04 I, 796. 0"
2, 69'1. 12
-i 317. 1 c' " 386. 73
') L;21 • :)3 3, Ll21. 53 3 42 ~. 53
0
~, - _) - ,
..), ,
995, 78 1, 991. 56 2, 987.
34 5, 699. 84
.):- ~142 ~ 33
? 'j 1 3 .. 58
-, 913. 58 ?
r~ ~ ...., 58
,.J,
J, .J,
1, 095, 25 2, 190. 50
3, 285. 75 '--:, U89. 24
-c ) .305. 60 4, 4";;8. 59
4, 483. 39 Ii.. 4 ~ ~ ~ 39-,
1 203. 71 2, 407. 42
611. 1 ') 514. 32
S 12. 77 r ( -)- 6r:; 5, 109. 29
5, 1~-:; 29
, ,
J, ,J -0,
-t: ~
:J, ) j 'J • "
1, 315. 42 2, 630. 84 3, 946.
26
, (;152. 15
- ., h 15 5 S~~O.. 32 5,
753. 97 5, 7:: ~, 97
~)
- , -, _) - . ,
437. 68 875. 36
--1, 313. 04 431.
()1 -, "OC,: • 20 6, ",()6. 33 6,
468. 79 C, L' - 79
1, Z,
' ,
,
r -
1, 563. 61
CJ 127. 22 J. 690, 83
926. 07 C',
;:,0(1. 48 6, (-j r-j 2. 32 7, 283. 85
7,ZO' 85
.J,
, , :-.1)
~ j.
1 694. 52
? 389. OLl "- OS3. 56
I 439. 85
- 1 1 r:,. 49 7, 7u6. 09 8, 132. 37
Fl, 2:: j. 37
..), - , (__., J
' .
,
The rate of acnnne]atioc jc ,'r,. P"'" yea", ocsuming U,e y,,'''-'5 connik.ion is payabk at the cn.' of the ),"'H.
In the body or the pOlpcr, aCt ',mula tcd a mmn-ts have bee',", ",'-U,e! cd to n<'''- cst $] O. ')0.(a)
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AC(:1_lrn\!12lt,c~r_1Contributions at RetirernC'nt Dates
11 )
I ()74
.~L_
tax contrihution In year X
\vh(~:r(" c - social seCllr
.L _e' :Innual r o.t c of i.lltcre;:;t
_r'r-c,;,.'nL V"11uC' of F'l1tlll'(: ]',cncLits :11. l{_c:ti r crnr. nt D~Lt('
(2 )
p,.
" (12)
abS
rnonth1y rctin:rnent benefit (pr-irnary insurance
arnount)
w ho r c D
rt nri =
!I (12.)
JJU_t9
II 1 1
~l r- --- _-
6:J 24,
where
i t _, ' d_. IS tnc a ppr o?:nnate a -
24
justrnent froln annual to fnonthly
payr:nent
,(;.,..) ( '1..:-;:: }. pc r' __ 11
... _', \ • ') ')1 2' 'Ji.= () 10 / _.
4'---1(_1 -_-:')t tP~J
L.- I-to_:j_ ~
t= () ...-
1 1
24
forrn1tla (2) b(oCOrY1C5
1
----
j
u'> J.r',' ol:;' ( ..__~o )
L---- \Hi}
t=o -
I I
.':1
(l, 1)
probability of individu;ll .'l!.;C: 6') surviving to
yeiLr X
11 i1
2
,11C OJ t <.1U:; 1 in:-l b I C' i\ f',' , ,I (' ( (I!' rli I 'I ).', t () Vl 1)'1 r . (j [
Inl)rLali ty (' I'nploy "cl
(A 1
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